view misc/systemd/socket-activation.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 3296a09b4e57
children
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-- Monkeypatch to support socket activation
--
-- Requires LuaSocket after "agnostic" changes merged
--
-- To enable:
-- RunScript "socket-activation.lua"

local socket = require"socket";
local tcp_serv_mt = debug.getregistry()["tcp{server}"];
local socket_bind = socket.bind;

local SD_LISTEN_FDS_START = 3;

local fds = tonumber(os.getenv"LISTEN_FDS") or 0;

if fds < SD_LISTEN_FDS_START then return; end

local servs = {};

for i = 1, fds do
	local serv = socket.tcp();
	if serv:getfd() >= 0 then
		return; -- This won't work, we will leak the old FD
	end
	debug.setmetatable(serv, tcp_serv_mt);
	serv:setfd(SD_LISTEN_FDS_START + i - 1);
	local ip, port = serv:getsockname();
	servs [ ip .. ":" .. port ] = serv;
end

function socket.bind( ip, port, backlog )
	local sock = servs [ ip .. ":" .. port ];
	if sock then
		servs [ ip .. ":" .. port ] = nil;
		return sock;
	end
	if next(servs) == nil then
		-- my work here is done
		socket.bind = socket_bind;
	end
	return socket_bind( ip, port, backlog );
end