mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.

author "Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>"
description "Prosody XMPP server"

# Normal runlevel based start and stop
start on runlevel [2345]
stop on runlevel [!2345]

# Alternate method for starting and stopping
# when a network interface comes and goes
#
# start on net-device-up IFACE=eth0
# stop on net-device-down IFACE=eth0

# Change user so Prosdy doesn't have to
setgid prosody
setuid prosody

# Set a sensible umask
umask 0027

# Run prosody
exec /usr/bin/prosody

# Collect stdout into a log file
console log

# Restart on crashes
respawn
respawn limit 5 10