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view mod_alias/mod_alias_postfixadmin.sh @ 5682:527c747711f3

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mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 0c3ba5ff7a3b
children
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#!/bin/sh
# Copyright (C) 2015 Travis Burtrum
# This file is MIT/X11 licensed.

# run like ./mod_alias_postfixadmin.sh "mysql -N -upostfixadmin -ppostfixadmin postfixadmin" > /etc/prosody/aliases.cfg.lua
# then put:
# Include "aliases.cfg.lua"
# in prosody.cfg.lua

mysql="$1"

echo "-- alias plugin, generated by mod_alias_postfixadmin.sh"
echo "aliases = {"

echo "SELECT concat('["'"'"', address, '"'"'"] = "'"'"', goto, '"'"'";') FROM alias WHERE address != goto;
SELECT concat('["'"'"', address, '"'"'"] = "'"'"', goto, '"'"'";') FROM (
	select replace(address, concat('@', target_domain), concat('@', alias_domain)) as address, goto FROM alias JOIN alias_domain ON alias_domain.target_domain = SUBSTRING(alias.address, locate('@',alias.address) + 1, length(alias.address))
) a WHERE a.address != a.goto;" | $mysql | sort | uniq

echo "}"