Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_audit_status/mod_audit_status.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 14b6397cd6de |
children | 9944c6c3e914 |
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module:depends("audit"); local st = require "util.stanza"; -- Suppress warnings about module:audit() -- luacheck: ignore 143/module local heartbeat_interval = module:get_option_number("audit_status_heartbeat_interval", 60); local store = module:open_store(nil, "keyval+"); module:hook_global("server-started", function () local recorded_status = store:get(); if recorded_status and recorded_status.status == "started" then module:audit(nil, "server-crashed", { timestamp = recorded_status.heartbeat }); end module:audit(nil, "server-started"); store:set_key(nil, "status", "started"); end); module:hook_global("server-stopped", function () module:audit(nil, "server-stopped", { custom = { prosody.shutdown_reason and st.stanza("note"):text(prosody.shutdown_reason); }; }); store:set_key(nil, "status", "stopped"); end); if heartbeat_interval then module:add_timer(0, function () store:set_key(nil, "heartbeat", os.time()); return heartbeat_interval; end); end