Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_auth_token/test_token_auth.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | d0ca211e1b0e |
children |
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local base64 = require "util.encodings".base64; local hmac = require "openssl.hmac"; local luatz = require "luatz"; local luaunit = require "luaunit"; local uuid = require "uuid"; local otp = require "otp"; local mock = require "mock"; local pkey = require "openssl.pkey"; local token_utils = dofile("token_auth_utils.lib.lua"); math.randomseed(os.time()) local OTP_SEED = 'E3W374VRSFO4NVKE'; function generate_token(jid, key) local nonce = ''; for i=1,32 do nonce = nonce..math.random(9); end local utc_time_table = luatz.gmtime(luatz.time()); local totp = otp.new_totp_from_key( OTP_SEED, token_utils.OTP_DIGITS, token_utils.OTP_INTERVAL ):generate(0, utc_time_table); local hmac_ctx = hmac.new(key, token_utils.DIGEST_TYPE) local signature = hmac_ctx:final(totp..nonce..jid) return totp..nonce..' '..base64.encode(signature) end function test_token_verification() -- Test verification of a valid token local key = uuid(); local result = token_utils.verify_token( 'root', generate_token('root@localhost', key), 'localhost', OTP_SEED, key ) luaunit.assert_is(result, true) end function test_token_is_valid_only_once() local key = uuid(); local token = generate_token('root@localhost', key); local result = token_utils.verify_token( 'root', token, 'localhost', OTP_SEED, key ) luaunit.assert_is(result, true) result = token_utils.verify_token( 'root', token, 'localhost', OTP_SEED, key ) luaunit.assert_is(result, false) end function test_token_expiration() -- Test that a token expires after (at most) the configured interval plus -- any amount of deviations. local key = uuid(); local token = generate_token('root@localhost', key); -- Wait two ticks of the interval window and then check that the token is -- no longer valid. mock.mock(os); os.time.replace(function () return os.time.original() + (token_utils.OTP_INTERVAL + (token_utils.OTP_DEVIATION * token_utils.OTP_INTERVAL)); end) result = token_utils.verify_token( 'root', token, 'localhost', OTP_SEED, key ) mock.unmock(os); luaunit.assert_is(result, false) end os.exit(luaunit.LuaUnit.run())