Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_auth_token/token_auth_utils.lib.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 0fb12a4b6106 |
children |
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local base64 = require "util.encodings".base64; local hmac = require "openssl.hmac"; local luatz = require "luatz"; local otp = require "otp"; local DIGEST_TYPE = "SHA256"; local OTP_DEVIATION = 1; local OTP_DIGITS = 8; local OTP_INTERVAL = 30; local nonce_cache = {}; local function check_nonce(jid, otp_value, nonce) -- We cache all nonces used per OTP, to ensure that a token cannot be used -- more than once. -- -- We assume that the OTP is valid in the current time window. This is the -- case because we only call check_nonce *after* the OTP has been verified. -- -- We only store one OTP per JID, so if a new OTP comes in, we wipe the -- previous OTP and its cached nonces. if nonce_cache[jid] == nil or nonce_cache[jid][otp_value] == nil then nonce_cache[jid] = {} nonce_cache[jid][otp_value] = {} nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] = true return true; end if nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] == true then return false; else nonce_cache[jid][otp_value][nonce] = true; return true; end end local function verify_token(username, password, otp_seed, token_secret, log) local totp = otp.new_totp_from_key(otp_seed, OTP_DIGITS, OTP_INTERVAL) local token = string.match(password, "(%d+) ") local otp_value = token:sub(1,8) local nonce = token:sub(9) local signature = base64.decode(string.match(password, " (.+)")) local jid = username.."@"..module.host if totp:verify(otp_value, OTP_DEVIATION, luatz.time()) then log("debug", "The TOTP was verified"); local hmac_ctx = hmac.new(token_secret, DIGEST_TYPE) if signature == hmac_ctx:final(otp_value..nonce..jid) then log("debug", "The key was verified"); if check_nonce(jid, otp_value, nonce) then log("debug", "The nonce was verified"); return true; end end end log("debug", "Verification failed"); return false; end return { OTP_DEVIATION = OTP_DIGITS, OTP_DIGITS = OTP_DIGITS, OTP_INTERVAL = OTP_INTERVAL, DIGEST_TYPE = DIGEST_TYPE, verify_token = verify_token; }