view mod_compat_vcard/mod_compat_vcard.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 3df303543765
children
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-- Compatibility with clients and servers (i.e. ejabberd) that send vcard
-- requests to the full JID
--
-- https://support.process-one.net/browse/EJAB-1045

local jid_bare = require "util.jid".bare;
local st = require "util.stanza";
local core_process_stanza = prosody.core_process_stanza;

module:hook("iq/full", function(event)
	local stanza = event.stanza;
	local payload = stanza.tags[1];
	if payload and stanza.attr.type == "get" and payload.name == "vCard" and payload.attr.xmlns == "vcard-temp" then
		local fixed_stanza = st.clone(event.stanza);
		fixed_stanza.attr.to = jid_bare(stanza.attr.to);
		core_process_stanza(event.origin, fixed_stanza);
		return true;
	end
end, 1);