mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.

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