Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_email/mod_email.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 070faeaf51bc |
children |
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module:set_global(); local moduleapi = require "core.moduleapi"; local smtp = require"socket.smtp"; local config = module:get_option("smtp", { origin = "prosody", exec = "sendmail" }); local function send_email(to, headers, content) if type(headers) == "string" then -- subject headers = { Subject = headers; From = config.origin; }; end headers.To = to; if not headers["Content-Type"] then headers["Content-Type"] = 'text/plain; charset="utf-8"'; end local message = smtp.message{ headers = headers; body = content; }; if config.exec then local pipe = io.popen(config.exec .. " '"..to:gsub("'", "'\\''").."'", "w"); for str in message do pipe:write(str); end return pipe:close(); end return smtp.send({ user = config.user; password = config.password; server = config.server; port = config.port; domain = config.domain; from = config.origin; rcpt = to; source = message; }); end assert(not moduleapi.send_email, "another email module is already loaded"); function moduleapi:send_email(email) --luacheck: ignore 212/self return send_email(email.to, email.headers or email.subject, email.body); end