Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_host_status_check/mod_host_status_check.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 3d80f8dba886 |
children |
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local time = require "socket".gettime; local heartbeats = module:shared("/*/host_status_check/heartbeats"); local connection_events = module:shared("/*/host_status_check/connection_events"); if prosody.hosts[module.host].type == "component" and module:get_option_string("component_module") == "component" then module:hook("component-authenticated", function () connection_events[module.host] = { connected = true; timestamp = time() }; end); -- Note: this event is not in 0.9, and requires a recent 0.10 or trunk build module:hook("component-disconnected", function () connection_events[module.host] = { connected = false; timestamp = time() }; end); module:hook("stanza/xmpp:prosody.im/heartbeat:heartbeat", function () heartbeats[module.host] = time(); return true; end); else connection_events[module.host] = { connected = true, timestamp = time() }; end function module.unload() connection_events[module.host] = { connected = false, timestamp = time() }; heartbeats[module.host] = nil; end