view mod_host_status_check/mod_host_status_check.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 3d80f8dba886
children
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local time = require "socket".gettime;

local heartbeats = module:shared("/*/host_status_check/heartbeats");
local connection_events = module:shared("/*/host_status_check/connection_events");

if prosody.hosts[module.host].type == "component" and module:get_option_string("component_module") == "component" then
	module:hook("component-authenticated", function ()
		connection_events[module.host] = { connected = true; timestamp = time() };
	end);

	-- Note: this event is not in 0.9, and requires a recent 0.10 or trunk build
	module:hook("component-disconnected", function ()
		connection_events[module.host] = { connected = false; timestamp = time() };
	end);

	module:hook("stanza/xmpp:prosody.im/heartbeat:heartbeat", function ()
		heartbeats[module.host] = time();
		return true;
	end);
else
	connection_events[module.host] = { connected = true, timestamp = time() };
end

function module.unload()
	connection_events[module.host] = { connected = false, timestamp = time() };
	heartbeats[module.host] = nil;
end