Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_host_status_heartbeat/mod_host_status_heartbeat.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 7f955f92bbbb |
children |
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local st = require "util.stanza"; local time = require "socket".gettime; local heartbeat_interval = module:get_option_number("status_check_heartbeat_interval", 5); local heartbeat_mode = module:get_option_string("status_check_heartbeat_mode", "remote"); local local_heartbeats = module:shared("/*/host_status_check/heartbeats"); local heartbeat_methods = { ["local"] = function() module:log("debug", "Local heartbeat"); local_heartbeats[module.host] = time(); return heartbeat_interval; end; ["remote"] = function () module:fire_event("route/remote", { origin = prosody.hosts[module.host]; stanza = st.stanza("heartbeat", { xmlns = "xmpp:prosody.im/heartbeat" }); }); return heartbeat_interval; end; } local send_heartbeat = assert(heartbeat_methods[heartbeat_mode], "Unknown heartbeat_mode: "..heartbeat_mode); module:add_timer(0, send_heartbeat);