view mod_idlecompat/mod_idlecompat.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 4b58e35a72e0
children
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-- Last User Interaction in Presence via Last Activity compatibility module
-- http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0319.html
-- http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0256.html
-- Copyright (C) 2014 Tobias Markmann
--
-- This file is MIT/X11 licensed.

local st = require "util.stanza";
local datetime = require "util.datetime";

local function on_presence(event)
	local stanza = event.stanza;

	local last_activity = stanza:get_child("query", "jabber:iq:last");
	local has_idle = stanza:get_child("idle", "urn:xmpp:idle:1");
	if last_activity and not has_idle then
		module:log("debug", "Adding XEP-0319 tag from Last Activity.");
		local seconds = last_activity.attr.seconds;
		local last_userinteraction = datetime.datetime(os.time() - seconds);
		stanza:tag("idle", { xmlns = "urn:xmpp:idle:1", since = last_userinteraction }):up();
	end
end

-- incoming
module:hook("presence/full", on_presence, 900);
module:hook("presence/bare", on_presence, 900);

-- outgoing
module:hook("pre-presence/bare", on_presence, 900);
module:hook("pre-presence/full", on_presence, 900);
module:hook("pre-presence/host", on_presence, 900);