Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_jid_prep/mod_jid_prep.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 99cb06b31ae8 |
children |
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-- Run JIDs through stringprep processing on behalf of clients -- http://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/jidprep.html local jid_prep = require "util.jid".prep; local st = require "util.stanza"; local xmlns_prep = "urn:xmpp:jidprep:0"; module:add_feature(xmlns_prep); function prep_jid(event) local stanza = event.stanza; local jid = jid_prep(stanza:get_child_text("jid", xmlns_prep)); if not jid then return event.origin.send(st.error_reply(stanza, "modify", "jid-malformed")); end return event.origin.send(st.reply(stanza):tag("jid", { xmlns = xmlns_prep }):text(jid)); end module:hook("iq/host/"..xmlns_prep..":jid", prep_jid); module:depends("http"); module:provides("http", { route = { ["GET /*"] = function (event, jid) return jid_prep(jid) or 400; end; } });