view mod_jid_prep/mod_jid_prep.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 99cb06b31ae8
children
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-- Run JIDs through stringprep processing on behalf of clients
-- http://xmpp.org/extensions/inbox/jidprep.html

local jid_prep = require "util.jid".prep;
local st = require "util.stanza";

local xmlns_prep = "urn:xmpp:jidprep:0";

module:add_feature(xmlns_prep);

function prep_jid(event)
	local stanza = event.stanza;
	local jid = jid_prep(stanza:get_child_text("jid", xmlns_prep));
	if not jid then
		return event.origin.send(st.error_reply(stanza, "modify", "jid-malformed"));
	end
	return event.origin.send(st.reply(stanza):tag("jid", { xmlns = xmlns_prep }):text(jid));
end


module:hook("iq/host/"..xmlns_prep..":jid", prep_jid);

module:depends("http");
module:provides("http", {
	route = {
		["GET /*"] = function (event, jid)
			return jid_prep(jid) or 400;
		end;
	}
});