view mod_limit_auth/README.markdown @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 4916c1b6517f
children
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---
summary: Throttle authentication attempts with optional tarpit
...

Introduction
============

This module lets you put a per-IP limit on the number of failed
authentication attempts.

It features an optioanal
[tarpit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarpit_%28networking%29), i.e.
waiting some time before returning an "authentication failed" response.

Configuration
=============

``` {.lua}
modules_enabled = {
  -- your other modules
  "limit_auth";
}

limit_auth_period = 30 -- over 30 seconds

limit_auth_max = 5 -- tolerate no more than 5 failed attempts

 -- Will only work with Prosody trunk:
limit_auth_tarpit_delay = 10 -- delay answer this long
```

Compatibility
=============

Requires 0.9 or later. The tarpit feature requires Prosody trunk.