view mod_measure_client_identities/mod_measure_client_identities.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents fdbf7c2aed7b
children
line wrap: on
line source

module:set_global();

local measure = require"core.statsmanager".measure;

local counters = {
	unknown = measure("amount", "client_identities.unknown"),
};

module:hook("stats-update", function ()
	local buckets = {
		unknown = 0,
	};
	for _, session in pairs(prosody.full_sessions) do
		if session.caps_cache ~= nil then
			local node_string = session.caps_cache.attr.node;
			local node = node_string:match("([^#]+)");
			if buckets[node] == nil then
				buckets[node] = 0;
			end
			buckets[node] = buckets[node] + 1;
		else
			buckets.unknown = buckets.unknown + 1;
		end
	end
	local visited = {};
	for bucket, count in pairs(buckets) do
		if counters[bucket] == nil then
			counters[bucket] = measure("amount", "client_identities."..bucket);
		end
		counters[bucket](count);
		visited[bucket] = true;
	end
	for bucket, counter in pairs(counters) do
		if not visited[bucket] then
			counter(0);
		end
	end
end)