Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_measure_client_identities/mod_measure_client_identities.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | fdbf7c2aed7b |
children |
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module:set_global(); local measure = require"core.statsmanager".measure; local counters = { unknown = measure("amount", "client_identities.unknown"), }; module:hook("stats-update", function () local buckets = { unknown = 0, }; for _, session in pairs(prosody.full_sessions) do if session.caps_cache ~= nil then local node_string = session.caps_cache.attr.node; local node = node_string:match("([^#]+)"); if buckets[node] == nil then buckets[node] = 0; end buckets[node] = buckets[node] + 1; else buckets.unknown = buckets.unknown + 1; end end local visited = {}; for bucket, count in pairs(buckets) do if counters[bucket] == nil then counters[bucket] = measure("amount", "client_identities."..bucket); end counters[bucket](count); visited[bucket] = true; end for bucket, counter in pairs(counters) do if not visited[bucket] then counter(0); end end end)