Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_measure_memory/mod_measure_memory.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | e17c937a71b3 |
children |
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module:set_global(); local measure = require"core.statsmanager".measure; local measures = {}; setmetatable(measures, { __index = function (t, k) local m = measure("amount", "memory."..k, { units = "bytes" }); t[k] = m; return m; end }); module:hook("stats-update", function () measures.lua(collectgarbage("count")*1024); end); if require"lfs".attributes("/proc/self/statm", "mode") == "file" then local pagesize = module:get_option_number("memory_pagesize", 4096); -- getconf PAGESIZE module:hook("stats-update", function () local statm, err = io.open("/proc/self/statm"); if not statm then module:log("error", tostring(err)); return; end -- virtual memory (caches, opened librarys, everything) measures.total(statm:read("*n") * pagesize); -- resident set size (actually used memory) measures.rss(statm:read("*n") * pagesize); statm:close(); end); end