Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_measure_modules/mod_measure_modules.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | ecfd7aece33b |
children |
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module:set_global(); local mm = require "core.modulemanager"; local sm = require "core.statsmanager"; local measure_status = sm.metric("gauge", "prosody_module_status", "", "Prosody module status", { "host"; "module" }); local status_priorities = { error = 3; warn = 2; info = 1; core = 0 }; function module.add_host(module) local measure = measure_status:with_partial_label(module.host); if module.global then measure = measure_status:with_partial_label(":global"); end -- Already loaded modules local modules = mm.get_modules(module.host); for name, mod in pairs(modules) do measure:with_labels(name):set(status_priorities[mod.module.status_type] or 0); end -- TODO hook module load and unload -- Future changes module:hook("module-status/updated", function(event) local mod = mm.get_module(event.name); measure:with_labels(event.name):set(status_priorities[mod and mod.module.status_type] or 0); end); end module:add_host(); -- Initialize global context