Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_muc_block_pm/mod_muc_block_pm.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 67f7df9892bb |
children |
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local st = require "util.stanza"; module:hook("muc-disco#info", function(event) table.insert(event.form, { name = "muc#roomconfig_allowpm"; value = "moderators" }); end); module:hook("muc-private-message", function(event) local stanza, room = event.stanza, event.room; local from_occupant = room:get_occupant_by_nick(stanza.attr.from); if from_occupant and from_occupant.role == "moderator" then return -- moderators may message anyone end local to_occupant = room:get_occupant_by_nick(stanza.attr.to) if to_occupant and to_occupant.role == "moderator" then return -- messaging moderators is ok end if to_occupant.bare_jid == from_occupant.bare_jid then return -- to yourself is okay, used by some clients to sync read state in public channels end room:route_to_occupant(from_occupant, st.error_reply(stanza, "cancel", "policy-violation", "Private messages are disabled", room.jid)) return false; end, 1);