mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.

---
labels:
- 'Stage-Alpha'
summary: 'Require MUC occupant nicknames to no match some patterns'
---

Introduction
============

This checks the nickname of a joining user against a configurable list of
[Lua patterns](https://www.lua.org/manual/5.2/manual.html#6.4.1), and prevents
them from joining if it matches any of them.

Configuration
=============

There is a single configuration option, `muc_reserve_nick_patterns` and the
default is `{}` - i.e. allow everything.

Compatibility
=============

Requires Prosody 0.11 or higher.