view mod_persisthosts/mod_persisthosts.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents 366fadb5c6e5
children
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-- mod_persisthosts
module:set_global();

local set = require"util.set";
local stat = require"lfs".attributes;
local resolve_relative_path = require"core.configmanager".resolve_relative_path;

local vhost_path = module:get_option_string("persisthosts_path", "conf.d");
local path_pattern = resolve_relative_path(prosody.paths.config, vhost_path) .. "/%s.cfg.lua";

local original = set.new();
original:include(prosody.hosts);

module:hook("host-activated", function(host)
	if not original:contains(host) then
		local path = path_pattern:format(host);
		if not stat(path) then
			local fh, err = io.open(path, "w");
			if fh then
				fh:write(("VirtualHost%q\n"):format(host));
				module:fire_event("host-persisted", { host = host, file = fh });
				fh:close();
				module:log("info", "Config file for host '%s' created", host);
			else
				module:log("error", "Could not open '%s' for writing: %s", path, err or "duno");
			end
		else
			module:log("debug", "File '%s' existed already", path);
		end
	else
		module:log("debug", "VirtualHost '%s' existed already", host);
	end
end);