Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_persisthosts/mod_persisthosts.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | 366fadb5c6e5 |
children |
line wrap: on
line source
-- mod_persisthosts module:set_global(); local set = require"util.set"; local stat = require"lfs".attributes; local resolve_relative_path = require"core.configmanager".resolve_relative_path; local vhost_path = module:get_option_string("persisthosts_path", "conf.d"); local path_pattern = resolve_relative_path(prosody.paths.config, vhost_path) .. "/%s.cfg.lua"; local original = set.new(); original:include(prosody.hosts); module:hook("host-activated", function(host) if not original:contains(host) then local path = path_pattern:format(host); if not stat(path) then local fh, err = io.open(path, "w"); if fh then fh:write(("VirtualHost%q\n"):format(host)); module:fire_event("host-persisted", { host = host, file = fh }); fh:close(); module:log("info", "Config file for host '%s' created", host); else module:log("error", "Could not open '%s' for writing: %s", path, err or "duno"); end else module:log("debug", "File '%s' existed already", path); end else module:log("debug", "VirtualHost '%s' existed already", host); end end);