mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.

This module adds a `portcheck` command to the [shell][doc:console]
intended for use with health checks, i.e. to check whether Prosody is
listening to all expected ports.

# Usage

After installing and enabling the module a command like this becomes
available:

``` bash
prosodyctl shell "portcheck [::]:5222 *:5222 [::]:5269 *:5269"
```

This would check if the c2s (`5222`) and s2s (`5269`) ports are
available on both IPv6 (`*`) and *Legacy IP*^[often referred to as IPv4].

# Compatibility

Compatible with Prosody **trunk**, will **not** work with 0.11.x or
earlier.