Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_s2s_auth_fingerprint/mod_s2s_auth_fingerprint.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | ee2cedb0f691 |
children |
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-- Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Kim Alvefur -- This file is MIT/X11 licensed. module:set_global(); local digest_algo = module:get_option_string(module:get_name().."_digest", "sha1"); local fingerprints = {}; local function hashprep(h) return tostring(h):gsub(":",""):lower(); end local function hashfmt(h) return h:gsub("..","%0:", #h/2-1):upper(); end for host, set in pairs(module:get_option("s2s_trusted_fingerprints", {})) do local host_set = {} if type(set) == "table" then -- list of fingerprints for i=1,#set do host_set[hashprep(set[i])] = true; end else -- assume single fingerprint host_set[hashprep(set)] = true; end fingerprints[host] = host_set; end module:hook("s2s-check-certificate", function(event) local session, host, cert = event.session, event.host, event.cert; local host_fingerprints = fingerprints[host]; if host_fingerprints then local digest = cert and cert:digest(digest_algo); if host_fingerprints[digest] then module:log("info", "'%s' matched %s fingerprint %s", host, digest_algo:upper(), hashfmt(digest)); session.cert_chain_status = "valid"; session.cert_identity_status = "valid"; return true; else module:log("warn", "'%s' has unknown %s fingerprint %s", host, digest_algo:upper(), hashfmt(digest)); session.cert_chain_status = "invalid"; session.cert_identity_status = "invalid"; end end end);