view mod_s2s_auth_samecert/mod_s2s_auth_samecert.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents c9397cd5cfe6
children
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module:set_global()

local hosts = prosody.hosts;

module:hook("s2s-check-certificate", function(event)
	local session, cert = event.session, event.cert;
	if not cert or session.direction ~= "incoming" then return end

	local outgoing = hosts[session.to_host].s2sout[session.from_host];
	if outgoing and outgoing.type == "s2sout" and outgoing.secure and outgoing.conn:socket():getpeercertificate():pem() == cert:pem() then
		session.log("debug", "Certificate matches that of s2sout%s", tostring(outgoing):match("[a-f0-9]+$"));
		session.cert_identity_status = outgoing.cert_identity_status;
		session.cert_chain_status = outgoing.cert_chain_status;
		return true;
	end
end, 1000);