view mod_s2sout_override/mod_s2sout_override.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents ae62d92506dc
children
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--% requires: s2sout-pre-connect-event

local url = require"socket.url";
local basic_resolver = require "net.resolvers.basic";

local override_for = module:get_option(module.name, {}); -- map of host to "tcp://example.com:5269"

module:hook("s2sout-pre-connect", function(event)
	local override = override_for[event.session.to_host] or override_for[event.session.to_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "*.")] or override_for["*"];
	if type(override) == "string" then
		override = url.parse(override);
	end
	if type(override) == "table" and override.scheme == "tcp" and type(override.host) == "string" then
		event.resolver = basic_resolver.new(override.host, tonumber(override.port) or 5269, override.scheme, {});
	elseif type(override) == "table" and override.scheme == "tls" and type(override.host) == "string" then
		event.resolver = basic_resolver.new(override.host, tonumber(override.port) or 5270, "tcp",
			{ servername = event.session.to_host; sslctx = event.session.ssl_ctx });
	end
end);