Mercurial > prosody-modules
view mod_s2sout_override/mod_s2sout_override.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3
mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode
RFC 7009 section 2.1 states:
> The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was
> issued to the client making the revocation request. If this
> validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of
> the error by the authorization server as described below.
The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later
part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af
It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be
allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible
thing to do.
author | Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se> |
---|---|
date | Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100 |
parents | ae62d92506dc |
children |
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--% requires: s2sout-pre-connect-event local url = require"socket.url"; local basic_resolver = require "net.resolvers.basic"; local override_for = module:get_option(module.name, {}); -- map of host to "tcp://example.com:5269" module:hook("s2sout-pre-connect", function(event) local override = override_for[event.session.to_host] or override_for[event.session.to_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "*.")] or override_for["*"]; if type(override) == "string" then override = url.parse(override); end if type(override) == "table" and override.scheme == "tcp" and type(override.host) == "string" then event.resolver = basic_resolver.new(override.host, tonumber(override.port) or 5269, override.scheme, {}); elseif type(override) == "table" and override.scheme == "tls" and type(override.host) == "string" then event.resolver = basic_resolver.new(override.host, tonumber(override.port) or 5270, "tcp", { servername = event.session.to_host; sslctx = event.session.ssl_ctx }); end end);