mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.

This module allows advertising a machine-readable document were outages,
planned or otherwise, may be reported.

See [XEP-0455: Service Outage Status] for further details, including
the format of the outage status document.

```lua
modules_enabled = {
    -- other modules
    "service_outage_status",
}

outage_status_urls = {
    "https://uptime.example.net/status.json",
}
```

The outage status document should be hosted on a separate server to
ensure availability even if the XMPP server is unreachable.