mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.

---
labels:
- 'Stage-Alpha'
- 'Type-Storage'
summary: Experimental map store optimized for small incremental changes
...

This is an experimental storage driver where changed data is appended.
Data is simply written as `key = value` pairs to the end of the file.
This allows changes to individual keys to be written without needing to
write out the entire object again, but reads would grow gradually larger
as it still needs to read old overwritten keys. This may be suitable for
e.g. rosters where individual contacts are changed at a time. In theory,
this could also allow rolling back changes.

Requires 0.10