view mod_turncredentials/README.markdown @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents cf1304ad2336
children
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# Introduction

[XEP-0215] implementation for [time-limited TURN
credentials](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-uberti-behave-turn-rest-00).

# Configuration

  Option                    Type     Default
  ------------------------- -------- ------------
  turncredentials\_secret   string   *required*
  turncredentials\_host     string   *required*
  turncredentials\_port     number   `3478`
  turncredentials\_ttl      number   `86400`

# Compatible TURN / STUN servers.

-   [coturn](https://github.com/coturn/coturn) - [setup guide][doc:coturn]
-   [restund](http://www.creytiv.com/restund.html)
-   [eturnal](https://eturnal.net/)

# Compatibility

Incompatible with [mod_extdisco](https://modules.prosody.im/mod_extdisco.html)