view mod_uptime_presence/mod_uptime_presence.lua @ 5682:527c747711f3

mod_http_oauth2: Limit revocation to clients own tokens in strict mode RFC 7009 section 2.1 states: > The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in > case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token was > issued to the client making the revocation request. If this > validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed of > the error by the authorization server as described below. The first part was already covered (in strict mode). This adds the later part using the hash of client_id recorded in 0860497152af It still seems weird to me that revoking a leaked token should not be allowed whoever might have discovered it, as that seems the responsible thing to do.
author Kim Alvefur <zash@zash.se>
date Sun, 29 Oct 2023 11:30:49 +0100
parents d3497b81a3b5
children
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local st = require"util.stanza";
local datetime = require"util.datetime";

local presence = st.presence({ from = module.host })
	:tag("delay", { xmlns = "urn:xmpp:delay",
		stamp = datetime.datetime(prosody.start_time) });

module:hook("presence/host", function(event)
	local stanza = event.stanza;
	if stanza.attr.type == "probe" then
		presence.attr.id = stanza.attr.id;
		presence.attr.to = stanza.attr.from;
		module:send(presence);
		return true;
	end
end, 10);